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Abstract: For over a decade, the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) and its United States 
predecessor have contemplated a Canal Amplification Project to allow larger boats to 
pass through the Panama Canal.  This project, as it is currently understood, would 
involve the construction of a new, “third” set of locks with greater capacity, the 
widening of channels within the Canal, and the flooding of approximately 45,000 
hectares of land currently occupied by campesinos/as.  Since the passage of a 1999 law 
that expanded the definition of the Panama Canal Watershed by 63 percent, some 
campesinos/as have united to oppose the flooding of their communities.  The social 
justice branch of the Catholic Church known as Pastoral Social-Cáritas Panamá has 
aided the opposition effort, criticizing the ACP’s secretive attitude toward the public 
and arguing that the artificial lakes, which the flooding would create, are not necessary.  
Indeed, alternatives exist that would save water without forcing these campesinos/as to 
relocate.  The larger issue, though, is that the whole Canal Amplification Project is not 
financeable and will harm rather than benefit the Panamanian people for decades.  This 
sober reality has yet to be recognized by more than a few concerned citizens.  The 
creation of artificial lakes and possible flooding in the Panama Canal’s Western 
Watershed, even with its potential to emburden the lives of thousands of people, 
represents only a small fraction of the problematic aspects of the proposed Canal 
Amplification Project.  However, when viewed as a microcosm of the proyect as a 
whole, the study of this conflict serves as a methodologically invaluable tool for 
understanding the dangers that the larger project poses to the Panamanian people.  This 
paper will develop a detailed account of the flooding controversy and argue that the 
ACP, in trying to sell the Canal Amplification Project, uses the same practices of 
underestimating or hiding negative aspects and costs that have been widely opposed in 
the issue of the artificial lakes. 
 
Keywords: Panama Canal, Canal expansion, megaprojects, social conflict, external debt 
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Resumen Ejecutivo 
 
Dentro de este mes, la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá anunciará los planes del 
Proyecto de la Ampliación del Canal, y la construcción podría empezar dentro de un 
año.  Este proyecto involucrará la construcción de un tercer juego de esclusas con la 
capacidad de dejar pasar los barcos Post-Panamax, los cuales son demasiado grandes 
para pasar a través del Canal actual.  En la historia de la República de Panamá, la idea 
de aumentar la capacidad de las esclusas se ha discutido varias veces.  Hoy, la ACP dice 
que el proyecto es necesario para mantener un Canal competitivo en el comercio 
marítimo mundial, y cita el hecho de que cada año más barcos de tamaño Post-Panamax 
se construyen.  La ACP también ha dicho que será necesario construir embalses en tres 
ríos oeste del Canal, en un área que se incorporó a la Cuenca Hidrográfica del Canal con 
la aprobación de la Ley 44 el último día de la presidencia de Ernesto Pérez Balladares, 
el 31 de agosto de 1999.  Estos embalses inundarían 45,000 hectáreas de tierra donde 
viven 8,500 o más campesinos, mayormente en la provincia de Coclé. 
 Después de la aprobación de esta ley, que fue una sorpresa a toda la gente que 
vive en la nueva parte de la cuenca (la llamada Cuenca Occidental), un grupo de 
campesinos se reunieron en la Gran Asamblea Campesina Contra la Inundación con el 
propósito de rechazar cualquier proyecto que requiera su reubicación de sus tierras.  
Eventualmente, este grupo cambió su nombre a la Coordinadora Campesina Contra los 
Embalses (CCCE), y desde entonces ha opuesto el proyecto con ayuda de Pastoral 
Social-Cáritas Panamá (PSCP), una organización de justicia social de la Iglesia 
Católica.  Según ellos, la ACP sigue escondiendo sus motivos desde que recibió la 
primera resistencia al proyecto.  También, estos grupos han preparado literatura que 
explica las maneras de proveer el agua necesaria para las esclusas nuevas sin construir 
los embalses.  Estas ideas, desarrolladas por ingenieros distinguidos, muestran que ni 
los embalses ni la reubicación de la gente es necesario para seguir con el Proyecto de la 
Ampliación del Canal, y es posible que la ACP anuncie este mes que no construirá estos 
embalses. 
 Hay un asunto más grande e importante que, hasta ahora, no ha recibido mucha 
atención pública.  Es que la declaración de la ACP, que la Canal se volverá obsoleto sin 
la ampliación, está basada en datos irrelevantes de barcos que no usan el Canal de 
Panamá.  Los datos de los barcos que pasan a través del Canal sugieren que el Canal 
seguirá siendo competitivo.  Ningún usuario ofrece invertir en el proyecto, una señal de 
la baja rentabilidad del proyecto.  Más grave, es probable que la ACP subestime el costo 
del proyecto para asegurar su aprobación, una práctica que ocurre en la mayoría de los 
proyectos de más de mil millones de dólares, según Bent Flyvberg, un profesor 
dinamarqués.  Por eso, este ensayo argumenta que aunque la inundación posible en la 
Cuenca Occidental del Canal de Panamá puede dificultar las vidas de miles de personas, 
este tema representa sólo una fracción pequeña de los aspectos problemáticos del 
Proyecto de la Ampliación del Canal.  Sin embargo, este conflicto sobre los embalses se 
puede ver como un microcosmo del proyecto entero, y así funciona como herramienta 
inapreciable para entender el peligro que el proyecto le causaría al pueblo panameño. 
 Usando información de la ACP, PSCP, académicos, economistas, y periódicos, 
este ensayo esboza una situación en la Cuenca Occidental en que la ACP rechaza 
contestarles a críticos responsables, ignora alternativas aceptables, y no comparte 
información importante con las personas afectadas.  Además, las mismas acciones están 
ocurriendo actualmente con el proyecto en general, pero hay más en juego porque las 
personas afectadas son la entereza del país de Panamá. 
 3
Introduction 
 
  Just one year after celebrating its centennial, the Republic of Panama in 2004 
faces what President-elect Martín Torrijos has called Panama’s “most important 
decision of the century.”1  The decision involves whether to move ahead with the 
Panama Canal Authority’s (Autoridad del Canal de Panama, or ACP) Canal 
Amplification Project, the details of which are scheduled to be revealed to the public 
during the month of June.  Indeed, considering the sheer size of the costs being 
discussed and the number of changes involved, the project would represent venturing 
into territory uncharted in the history of Panama.  Among a sector of the academic and 
technical communities, the potential risks and benefits of this project have been 
discussed over the last several years; however, among the general population of 
Panama, only one aspect of the project has grown to be a public controversy.  This 
aspect is the construction of three embalses, or artificial lakes created by damming a 
river, in what is known as the Western Region of the Canal’s Watershed, or the Western 
Watershed, that would flood some 45,000 hectares, mainly in the provinces of Coclé 
and Colón and require relocating 8,500 people, by ACP estimates.2  The people who 
live in these areas are known as campesinos/as, people who customarily live in rural 
areas and practice agriculture.  Major opposition to the creation of the lakes began in 
1999 and has involved coordinated education and opposition efforts over the last five 
years.  This effort has come from a group of community leaders called the Campesino 
Coordinating Group Against the Embalses (Coordinadora Campesina Contra los 
Embalses, or CCCE), with support from Pastoral Social-Cáritas Panamá (PSCP), a 
social justice organization of the Catholic Church, and the groups have succeeded in 
bringing this campesino/a rights issue to the public consciousness. 
 
 Unlike the issue of the embalses, which has received a great deal of public 
attention due to the efforts of the CCCE and PSCP, the other aspects of the Canal 
Amplification Project have received little public opposition.  Most people accept as fact 
the ACP’s assertion that expansion is necessary to prevent obsolescence of the Canal in 
the world economy and to guarantee a sufficient supply of water for Canal operations 
and municipal use.  However, abundant data suggest that the necessity of the project is 
not a given.  The few writers who express this point of view urge a critical evaluation of 
world shipping rates and of the project’s financial feasibility and potential profitability.  
Their concerns in terms of the project’s future negative effects on the 2.8 million people 
of Panama are not generally understood as clearly as the concerns of those who oppose 
the construction of the embalses in the Western Watershed.  The creation of embalses 
and possible flooding in the Panama Canal’s Western Watershed, even with its potential 
to emburden the lives of thousands of people, represents only a small fraction of the 
problematic aspects of the proposed Canal Amplification Project.  However, when 
viewed as a microcosm of the project as a whole, the study of this conflict serves as a 
methodologically invaluable tool for understanding the dangers that the larger project 
poses to the Panamanian people.   
 
To develop such a tool, this paper will provide a brief overview of canal 
modernization projects over the last one hundred years in order to place the current 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Eloy O. Aguilar, “Panama Leader to Decide on Canal Expansion,” Bucks County Courier 
Times, 30 April 2004. 
2 William Hughes, Impacto de la Ampliación del Canal de Panamá (Panama: Centro de Asistencia Legal 
Popular, 2002), 44, iv. 
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project in a historical trajectory.  It will then explain the conflict in the Western 
Watershed, citing key players’ opinions and positions acquired through interviews and 
literature.  After establishing an understanding of this particular conflict’s development, 
this paper will discuss some major points of contention relating to the Canal 
Amplification Project in general.  Using the case study of the Western Watershed 
conflict as a rubric for studying the whole Amplification Project, it will apply lessons 
learned from the former to extrapolate the potential effects of the latter and stress the 
need for public awareness of the project’s weak points. 
 
The Existent Canal and Historical Expansion Attempts 
 
 The history of the Republic of Panama is inextricably tied with the existence of 
the Panama Canal.  Panama succeeded in achieving independence from Colombia in 
1903 because of United States support, which the United States under President 
Theodore Roosevelt gladly provided in exchange for rights to construct a canal in 
Panama that would be wholly under U.S. sovereignty.  Even before construction of the 
Canal was completed in 1914, and at several different points during the twentieth 
century, the Panama Canal Commission (and its predecessor, the Isthmian Canal 
Commission) debated ways to improve and modernize the Canal.3  The first such debate 
in 1906 dealt with the issue of whether to build the Canal at sea level or to build a 
system of locks to pass boats through a canal 85 feet above sea level.  Roosevelt 
appointed a thirteen-member Board of Consulting Engineers to study both plans in 
detail, and while an eight-member majority favored a sea-level canal, Roosevelt 
eventually found the arguments of the minority for the safety and efficiency of a lock 
canal more convincing.  The minority wrote that a lock canal would save $100,000,000 
(“not a trifling sum, even for the resources of the United States”4) and six years of 
construction.  These savings would come from the fact that much less excavation would 
be required and that the construction of the locks and the excavation at Culebra, the two 
most intense areas of work, could occur simultaneously.  The minority also wrote that 
“if the sea-level canal should be built as now planned it would serve only a temporary 
purpose; a strong demand would arise within a few years for a broader and safer 
channel.”5  These two issues of how large a cost is manageable and how to make the 
Canal viable far into the future are the same issues that need to be examined critically 
with regard to the ACP’s current Canal Amplification Project. 
 
 The issue of creating lakes to store enough water for all of the Canal’s lockages, 
at the heart of the debate in the Western Watershed, similarly was first addressed many 
decades ago.  The Panama Canal was built along the path of the Chagres River, and the 
lock design allowed it to maintain the river’s freshwater status.  A freshwater canal has 
the additional benefit of providing drinking water, but because no water from either 
ocean can be allowed to enter through the locks, it is important to ensure that the water 
level of the canal can be maintained through rainfall.  The original engineers built Gatun 
Dam to accumulate and store water in Gatun Lake for the proper functioning of the 
canal.  It soon became clear that more storage would be necessary.  In the late 1920s 
plans began for the construction of Madden Dam, which in 1935 would fill Lake 
                                                 
3 Ricardo Arias Calderon, Ricardo Bermúdez Dutari, et al, “Aporte para un Consenso Nacional sobre el 
Futuro del Canal,” Panama, 2001. 
4 Report of the Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal, by George W. Davis, chairman, in 
U.S. Senate, document no. 231 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 97. 
5 Report of the Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal, 91. 
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Alajuela.6  However, during the rainiest months of the year, September and October, 
much fresh water is still sent straight to the ocean for lack of storage space. 
 
 The limiting factor in the size of ships that can pass through the Canal is the size 
of the locks, which have usable dimensions of 1,000 feet long by 110 feet wide by 41 
feet deep.  When a boat has dimensions (length and/or width) that are the maximum that 
can fit through the locks, the boat is referred to as Panamax, and Panamax boats have 
cargo capacities of up to 4,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units, a measure of cargo).  
Boats with dimensions too large to fit in the locks are known as Post-Panamax.  In order 
for boats of size Panamax and smaller to traverse the Canal, the boats must be raised 
and lowered by locks at three different locations.  A boat passing from the Caribbean 
Sea (Atlantic Ocean) to the Pacific Ocean passes through an approach channel to a 
series of three locks at Gatun which raise the boat a total of 85 feet.  It then passes 
through Gatun Lake, followed by the Culebra Cut through the Continental Divide, until 
it reaches Pedro Miguel Locks, where it is lowered 31 feet to Lake Miraflores.  Another 
two locks at Miraflores lower the boat to the Pacific approach channel, from which the 
boat exits to the Pacific Ocean.7   
 
As the limitations posed by the size of the locks became manifest, the debate 
over the relative merits of sea-level and lock canals from 1906 resurfaced on various 
occasions throughout the twentieth century, focusing on how to get around these 
limitations. The United States began work on a “third” set of locks, locks with a larger 
capacity than the existing locks, for the first time in 1939, with mainly military purposes 
in mind. These plans were halted in 1942 during World War II and did not continue.8  
In the 1950s, the United States again began studies on modernizing the Canal, 
investigating both the construction of a third set of locks and the potential for making 
the Canal sea level. In 1964, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a committee 
to study potential sea-level canal routes all along Central America, and in 1970, the 
commission announced that a sea-level canal would be more advantageous than the 
existing lock canal.9  Also in the 1970s, Culebra Cut was widened to 500 feet (from 
300) and deepened, and in the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaties, the United States agreed to 
transfer ownership rights of the Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama at the end of 
1999.10
 
The Tripartite Commission (1985-1993) Recommends New Locks 
 
While the seeds of the desire to expand the Panama Canal go back to the 1930s, 
the roots of the modern Canal Amplification Project can be traced to 1985, when the 
Tripartite Commission for the Study of the Alternatives to the Panama Canal was 
formed with members from Panama, the United States, and Japan.  The commission 
studied various alternatives, but it eventually selected two to study in greater detail.  
These alternatives were, not surprisingly, a High-Level Lock Canal (Third Set of Locks) 
                                                 
6 Arias Calderon, Bermúdez Dutari, et al, 11. 
7 "Panama Canal," Encyclopædia Britannica Online, <http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=120007>, 
cited 30 May 2004.   
8 Arias Calderon, Bermúdez Dutari, et al, 11-12. 
9 Arias Calderon, Bermúdez Dutari, et al, 12-13. 
10 “Panama Canal,” Encyclopædia Britannica Online, <http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=120007>, 
cited 30 May 2004; Panama Canal Treaty and Related Documents between the United States of America 
and the Republic of Panama, Washington, D.C., 7 September 1977, Panama Canal Authority, 
<http://www.pancanal.com/eng/history/index.htm>, cited 30 May 30, 2004. 
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and a Sea Level Canal, which would be constructed parallel to and 16 kilometers west 
of the Panama Canal.  The commission estimated the first option, which would widen 
and deepen the Canal and build larger-capacity locks adjacent to the existent locks, to 
require ten years and to cost between $5.4 and 8.5 billion, depending on whether to 
accommodate boats of maximum 150,000 or 200,000 DWT (dead weight tonnage) and 
whether to build one route or two.  The commission estimated the second option, which 
would accommodate boats of maximum 250,000 DWT, to require fifteen years and to 
cost between $10.9 and 13.5 billion, depending on whether to build one route or two.  
The commission studied economic, financial, sociocultural, environmental, structural, 
and political impacts of the alternatives, as well as impacts on the users and on Panama.  
The commission recommended that the Panamanian government undertake the the first 
alternative, the Third Set of Locks, with major advantages including the greater water 
supply it would ensure, the smaller number of highways whose construction would be 
required, and the smaller ecological impact on marine communities.  The commission 
stated that both options would have a long-term beneficial impact on Panama by giving 
Panama “a source of sustainable income” and raising Panama’s “geographic value.”11  
During the eight years of the commission, Panamanian newspapers periodically 
reported announcements from the commission, and articles continued with moderate 
frequency throughout the 1990s.  The studies reported during most of the 1990s 
received no major public opposition. 
 
The Controversy over Law 44 
 
A major turning point occurred on August 31, 1999, when the Legislative 
Assembly of Panama passed Law 44.  This law redefined the exact boundaries of the 
Panama Canal Watershed, adding a large section (213,112 hectares) of land west of the 
Canal that had never before been considered part of the Watershed, which had 
previously comprised 339,649 hectares in the provinces of Colón and Panamá.  The 
passage of this law came as a surprise to most Panamanians, especially those who lived 
in the newly defined “Western Watershed” and who had never before considered their 
land in any way related to the Canal.  The law said nothing about expansion nor any 
other sort of plans for the area added to the traditional watershed.  Its political 
importance and cause for alarm are tied to the 1997 Law 19, known as the organic law 
of the ACP, which defined the roles, responsibilities, and powers of the organization 
that would supplant the Panama Canal Commission as of December 31, 1999.  The 
organic law grants the ACP control over the water in the watershed.  In addition, it 
states: 
 
To safeguard said [hydric] resource, the Authority will coordinate...the 
administration, conservation and use of the natural resources of the 
watershed and will approve the strategies, policies, programs, and 
projects, public and private, that could affect the watershed [translation 
mine].12
 
                                                 
11 Esteban Martinez Lasso, “Las Alternativas al Canal de Panamá y Sus Impactos a Nivel Local y 
Global,” presented at the Encuentro Académico Internacional Sobre el Canal de Panamá, Universidad 
Santa María la Antigua, Panamá, 4-5 September 1997, page 8; 8-12. 
12 Asamblea Legislativa, Ley 19, Panamá, 11 June 1997, article 6. 
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Suddenly, with the passage of Law 44, this power to administer natural resources was 
expanded to an area that occupies a full seven percent of Panama’s area, roughly the 
size of the province of Herrera (see figure 1).13
 
Figure 1: The Panama Canal Watershed after Law 44, 1999 
 
 
 
Source: Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, 1999. 
 
According to the ACP, there was no ulterior motive behind the passage of Law 
44.  In a pamphlet entitled “Realities of the Panama Canal’s Hydrographic Watershed” 
(Realidades de la Cuenca Hidrográfica del Canal de Panamá), the ACP points out that 
the law has only two articles, neither of which says anything about the construction of 
lakes in the Watershed, and it assures its readers that the law does not change the 
ownership of the lands.  The pamphlet further claims that the preservation of natural 
resources in the Watershed requires the ACP’s presence, based on the levels of 
deforestation and soil erosion that have already taken place.14  The pamphlet’s 
defensive question-and-answer format seems to be arranged to dispel certain 
perceptions about the ACP and the law.  For example, such leading questions as “Is it 
true that the ACP only talks with one group of campesinos?” and “Does the Canal need 
more water only to serve the interests of international maritime commerce?” [translation 
mine], which are set up to be negated, reveal awareness of what others have taken as 
problematic aspects of the law.15  The pamphlet seeks to cement in the minds of the 
campesinos/as that live in the new Western Watershed that the passage of Law 44 was a 
simple act of defining, wholly separate from any plans to flood lands as part of a Canal 
expansion. 
 
                                                 
13 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “La Cuenca Hidrográfica del Canal,” undated. 
14 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “Realidades de la Cuenca Hidrográfica del Canal de Panamá,” 
undated. 
15 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “Realidades de la Cuenca Hidrográfica del Canal de Panamá,” 
undated. 
 8
However, in the minds of many residents of the Western Watershed and their 
supporters, the passage of the law represents a violation of their rights that is not 
separable from ominous future plans.  Much of the reason for this is the context of the 
passage of the law.  Prior to the passage of the law, there had been no studies done to 
explain why, geologically or hydrologically, the new lands would be an appropriate 
addition to the Canal’s watershed.  Even without receiving any documentary evidence, 
the Legislative Assembly passed the law extraordinarily rapidly: all three debates and 
the passage occurred within a period of 15 days.16  It was passed on the last day in 
office of Panamanian President Ernesto Pérez Balladares and his government, which 
meant that the president of the Republic and many of the legislators changed 
immediately after he signed the law.  Such a tactic is often used to pass a law that is 
expected to receive opposition because the outgoing officials cannot be held 
accountable after leaving office.  Just as the date precluded subsequent opposition, the 
secrecy of the law precluded antecedent opposition.  To many campesinos/as, the fact 
that they were not consulted on nor alerted about the law, and the fact that the Panama 
Canal Commission initiated technical studies of the area almost immediately after the 
law’s passage, signaled that the law must be a first step in the plans to expand the 
Canal.17
 
The Interdiocese Commission to Accompany the Communities Affected by Law 
44 (Comision Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a las Comunidades Afectadas por la 
Ley 44), a group that includes Pastoral Social-Cáritas Panamá, argues in its publication 
“A Voice Orientated toward the Problem of the Embalses” (Una Voz Orientada sobre el 
Problema de los Embalses) that there is no scientific legitimacy for adding the Western 
Watershed to the Panama Canal’s watershed, so there must be a political reason.  The 
ACP’s organic law defines the Canal’s hydrographic watershed as “the area whose 
surface and subterranean waters flow toward the canal or are emptied into it, as well as 
its embalses and lakes” [translation mine].18  The PSCP publication points out that the 
three main rivers of the Western Watershed, Río Coclé del Norte, Río Caño Sucio, and 
Río Indio, drain to the Caribbean Sea, not to the Panama Canal.  This suggests that they 
comprise, in fact, three distinct watersheds and are thus not included in the ACP organic 
law’s definition of the Panama Canal Watershed.19  For this reason, Eduardo A. 
Esquivel Ríos, in a 2002 opinion article in El Panamá América, argues that Law 44 is 
political and has intentions that are not transparent.  He writes, “If we accept the ACP’s 
reasons to consider this the watershed, the law could have easily said that the whole 
national territory should be preserved for the Canal’s water supply” [translation mine], 
referring to the ACP’s argument that defining the area as the watershed would allow the 
ACP to protect the environment in the area.20
 
Approximately one year after the passage of Law 44, the ACP released a 
document entitled “Concept of the Amplification of the Panama Canal,” and this 
document specified and organized the components of the project, most of which were 
                                                 
16 Comisión Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a las Comunidades Afectadas por la Ley 44, “Una Voz 
Orientadora sobre el Problema de los Embalses,” (Panama: Pastoral Social-Cáritas, 2002), 6. 
17 Herasto Reyes y Abdiel Zárate, “Ampliación de la cuenca del Canal: Incertidumbre en Coclesito,” La 
Prensa, 11 October 1999, 6A. 
18 Asamblea Legislativa, Ley 19, Panamá, 11 June 1997, article 2. 
19 Comisión Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a las Comunidades Afectadas por la Ley 44, 10. 
20 Eduardo A. Esquivel Ríos, “Sigue la Lucha de los Campesinos de la ‘Cuenca del Canal,’” El Panamá 
América, 12 May 2002.  Cited in Comisión Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a las Comunidades 
Afectadas por la Ley 44, 11. 
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already popularly known.  The project, which was estimated to cost $6.055 billion 
included: 
 
• The construction of a third set of locks. 
• The widening of the channels at both entrances to the Canal. 
• The widening of the channels of Gatun Lake and Culebra Cut. 
• The construction of one bridge near the Atlantic side and one bridge near the 
Pacific side. 
• The construction of a dam on Río Coclé del Norte with installed capacity of 150 
megawatts (MW) and a dam on Río Indio with installed capacity of 25 MW: 
• The creation of three embalses in the watersheds of Río Coclé del Norte, Río 
Caño Sucio, and Río Indio. 
• All of the infrastructure, waste deposition areas, and road construction necessary 
to complete the project.21 
 
Since the announcement of this project, based in large part on the results of the 
Tripartite Commission, the ACP has spent millions of dollars performing studies in the 
Western Watershed, while certain civilian groups have devoted themselves to opposing 
ACP action in the area.  What follows is an explanation of the conflict as it has 
developed and as it stands now. 
 
The Campesino Coordinating Group against the Embalses 
 
 Those living in the area that Law 44 added to the Watershed were quick to 
respond.  Upon receiving the news of the passage of this surprise law, a group of 
concerned community members began meeting and planning what sort of action to take.  
In October of 1999, they solicited a meeting with members of Cáritas Arquidiocesana, a 
social service group affiliated with the Catholic Church, in order to receive information 
about the law and to see maps of the newly defined Western Watershed.  They began 
disseminating the information, and in November of 1999, they held a meeting in the 
community of San Cristobal, which 1,200 campesinos/as attended.  Several 
representatives were chosen to record the resolutions of the meeting, called “The 
Declaration of San Cristobal,” and these individuals would become the leaders of the 
Campesino Coordinating Group against the Embalses (CCCE).  Throughout the next 
month, this smaller group help various meetings throughout the Western Watershed and 
even met with Panama Canal Commission engineer Agustín Arias.22
 
The group called another large meeting in December of 1999, and this meeting 
became known as the first Great Campesino Assembly against the Flooding (La Gran 
Asamblea Campesina Contra la Inundación).  The Great Assembly created a “Message 
to the Panamanian People and to the International Community,” to express publically 
their conclusions.  The people of the Great Assembly rejected Law 44 for its passage 
without consultation or discussion.  They vowed not to abandon their lands, and they 
demanded that the benefits generated by the Canal be put to social use.23  Those 
                                                 
21 Hughes, 1. 
22 Hilario Sánchez, “Memoria o el Inicio de la CCCE;” in Comisión Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a 
las Comunidades Afectadas por la Ley 44, appendix. 
23 Gran Asamblea Campesina Contra la Inundación, “Mensaje al pueblo panameño y a la comunidad 
internaciónal,” cited in “Campesinos Rechazan Ley 44 por Injusta,” Canal de Panamá Hoy 7, no. 41 
(March, 2000), 5. 
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individuals who had arranged the Great Assembly came to be known as the Campesino 
Coordinating Group against the Embalses (CCCE).  The leaders of the group include 
one representative from each of the major affected areas, which over time have come to 
include Río Indio-Lago, Coclé del Norte, Caño Sucio, Río Indio Centro, Trinidad, Ciri 
Grande, and Chiguiri Arriba.  There are also leaders for each corregimiento (the 
smallest political division recognized by the State) as well as leaders at an even more 
local level.  According to Ricardo Martínez, a member of the Pastoral Social-Cáritas 
team, approximately 85 percent of the people living in the Western Watershed support 
the work of the CCCE, and most of them consider themselves members of the group.  
This group continues to call Great Assemblies every year to evaluate their fight and plan 
for the next year, and large numbers of people attend from different parts of the Western 
Watershed.24  They communicate mainly through travel and word of mouth, as many of 
the areas where they work lack telephone or computer access. 
 
 Pastoral Social-Cáritas Panamá joined the CCCE in November of 1999 to offer 
support and, with its more accessible Panama City office, has been able to provide help 
with communication and publicity.25  Along with the Interdiocese Commission 
publication, which it helped to create, PSCP has two publications that regularly include 
articles and updates on the CCCE struggle in the Western Watershed: the extensive 
bimonthly bulletin known as Construyendo, por un Panamá Nuevo con Nuevas y 
Renovadas Estructuras (Building, for a new Panama with New and Renovated 
Structures), and the shorter monthly publication La Carta (The Letter).  PSCP also 
created, in June of 2003, a popular series called “No to the Flooding!” (¡No a la 
Inundación!), the goal of which is to summarize and explain the different points of 
contention to a wide audience. 
 
Social and Environmental Problems of Flooding 
 
 In its various publications, PSCP argues that the construction of the embalses 
will bring more and greater negative consequences than the ACP suggests.  First, PSCP 
claims that the population is much greater than 35,727, which the ACP calculated using 
the 2000 Census.26  PSCP says that there are many families that were not counted in the 
census, and that the real number is closer to 80,000.  Similarly, PSCP says that the 
number of people directly affected by the flooding would be 35,000, not 8,500.27  
Relocating the people from flooded land to other land in the Western Watershed, even 
using the ACP’s 8,500 figure, would crowd them into land that is already populated and 
already farmed.28  The alternative would be to move to urban areas of other provinces, 
but according to James E. Bernard V., Secretary General of the Public Defender of 
Panama, this move would require a complete change of lifestyle.  These campesinos/as 
have lived by subsistence for generations and would not be prepared to find work in 
more urban environments.29
 
                                                 
24 Ricardo Martínez, interview by author, Pastoral Social-Cáritas, Panamá, 2 June 2004. 
25 Ricardo Martínez, 2 June 2004. 
26 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “Resumen del estudio 2003: Recopilación y Presentación de Datos 
Socioeconómicos de la Región Occidental de la Cuenca del Canal,” 2003.  
27 “¿Qué Consecuencias Traen los Embalses?” ¡No a la Inundación! Cartilla no. 4 (Panama: Pastoral 
Social-Cáritas, 2003), 4. 
28 “¿Qué Consecuencias Traen los Embalses?” 5-6. 
29 James E. Bernard V., interview by author, Defensoría del Pueblo, Panama, 21 May 2004. 
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 PSCP also points to the environmental damage that the embalses would cause.  
Forests would have to be cut, not only in the flooded areas, but also in the areas where 
the ACP would build dams, penetration roads, transmission towers, waste sites, and 
security areas.30  Much of these lands constitute forests in Panama’s section of the 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, which is a project to conserve forests of the seven 
Central American countries and Mexico.31  The idea of a biological corridor is to 
maintain an area without interruption that species can occupy because so doing may 
help to prevent the extinction of threatened species that can occur from being too close 
to roads, factories, and other human-made structures.32  Building artificial lakes would 
create interruption along the Corridor.  Hughes enumerates other environmental effects 
that usually accompany the creation of dams, which include: loss of biodiversity along 
the rivers, loss of whole terrestrial ecosystems (from flooding), death of aquatic species 
due to the reduced oxygen content of stationary waters in created lakes, and prevention 
of fish migration.33
 
Technical Arguments against the Embalses 
 
 Social and environmental effects aside, PSCP shows that the construction of 
artificial lakes in the Western Watershed is not technically viable.  They cite World 
Bank criteria, established in 1997, that set minimum standards that a dam project must 
fulfill in order to be considered viable.  First, the ratio of money invested in the project 
over kilowatts (KW) of installed potential should be no higher than $2,500 per KW.  In 
the Western Watershed project, the ratio would be $24,000 per KW.  Second, a good 
site for an artificial lake is compact and deep.  The land to be flooded in the Western 
Watershed is flat, so the lakes would have to flood a much larger area.  Third, the ratio 
of hectares flooded to megawatts (MW) of installed electrical potential should be no 
higher than 50 hectares per MW.  The Western Watershed project would flood nearly 
900 hectares per MW.34  These data indicate that, as a way to provide water for the new 
set of locks, the creation of embalses in the Western Watershed would be an incredibly 
unviable alternative. 
 
 According to engineer Felipe A. Len-Ríos, an alternative exists that would not 
flood any new land but would instead put to better use the water in the traditional 
watershed.  The way the locks function currently, and have functioned since the 
construction of the Panama Canal, is that each time a ship its lowered to sea level to exit 
the Canal, the 55 million gallons of water present in the last lockage is sent to the ocean.  
Multiplied by the 38-43 boats that pass through the Canal daily,35 this is a vast amount 
of freshwater that the Canal can only use once.  The purpose of dumping this freshwater 
to the ocean is to prevent the Canal from salt-water contamination.  According to the 
ACP, this water would go directly to the sea, anyway, so by using the freshwater in the 
lockages, the Canal takes advantage of the water before it faces eventual contamination 
                                                 
30 “¿Qué Consecuencias Traen los Embalses?” 8-9. 
31 Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (National Environmental Authority), “Proyecto Corredor Biológico 
Mesoamericano del Atlántico Panameño,” 2002. 
32 Michael Roy, “Biodiversity,” lecture, Parque Nacional General D. Omar Torrijos Herrera, Panama, 19 
March 2004. 
33 Hughes, 128-29. 
34 Comisión Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a las Comunidades Afectadas por la Ley 44, 20. 
35 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “El Canal de Panamá,” Panama, 2003.  
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by the natural route.36  Len-Ríos has invented a system that would maintain the 
separation between fresh and salt water but allow for much of the freshwater to be 
recycled.  The system involves the construction of several lateral basins for each lock 
chamber.  As the ship descends from the level of the Canal, the water from the locks 
fills these lateral basins, beginning with the highest basin.  When the ship reaches sea 
level, the water in the lock at sea level will have to be sent to the ocean, so a certain 
(smaller) quantity of water would not be recycled.  To begin raising another ship with 
the same locks, approximately the same quantity of water will have to be taken from the 
lake supply.  However, the rest of the process of raising the second ship can be 
completed with the fresh water already saved in the lateral basins, beginning with the 
lowest basin.  The key to the system is the separation of the basins by altitude.  This 
would take advantage of the potential energy of the water and its tendency to fall due to 
gravity, which would remove the necessity for pumping.  Depending on the number of 
chambers constructed, 60 percent or more of the water can be recycled by this method, 
drastically reducing the extra water supply that the ACP would need for lock 
functioning and municipal water supply.37
 
Beyond recycling the water the Canal already uses, there is a source of new 
water that could be acquired without the social struggle involved in the plan that is 
unviable by World Bank standards: rain.  Currently, an average of more than 40 percent 
of the annual rainwater in the traditional watershed is lost for lack of space to store it.  
Former Chief Engineer of the Panama Canal Tomás Drohan Ruiz explains that this 
water could be saved by modernization work that would be less costly and less 
traumatic than the project in the Western Watershed.  It would require deepening the 
existent navigation channels by one meter and constructing an artificial lake in the 
traditional watershed, adjacent to Gatun Lake.38  The ACP has claimed that the subsoil 
rock in the area where this new lake, called Lake Trinidad, would be built is too soft, 
but Drohan argues that the project is indeed possible and safe and that in Japan and 
other places, dams have successfully been built on softer rock.39  The ACP is correct in 
its desire to be cautious—dam failures are tremendous catastrophes that can kill 
thousands of people—but many different independent engineers’ opinions should be 
consulted before ruling out the project. 
 
Words from the ACP 
 
 The reality is that the ACP does not say a great deal.  Today, in 2004, the ACP 
does not publish any material that refers to the construction of embalses in the Western 
Watershed.  When asked about the issue, Canal officials say that nothing has been 
decided. According to Executive Administration Manager Stanley Muschett, the ACP 
has never made a public statement that mentioned the creation of the embalses in the 
Western Watershed, and that all discussion of the issue is pure speculation.40  Instead, 
they point to the fact that studies are still underway and that decisions will be 
announced this June.  Indeed, the ACP has ordered more than 150 studies to be done on 
                                                 
36 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “Realidades de la Cuenca Hidrográfica del Canal de Panamá,” 
undated. 
37 Anonymous informant, 2004. 
38 Tomás Drohan Ruiz, “La Nueva Cuenca Occidental No es Necesaria,” El Panamá América, 12 July 
2001. 
39 Tomás Drohan Ruiz, “Trinidad y la Nueva Cuenca,” El Panamá América, 13 September 2002. 
40 Stanley Muschett, Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, Panama, 1 June 2004. 
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the project.41  However, according to PSCP coordinator Héctor Endara Hill and the 
Team of the PSCP National Office, Alberto Alemán Zubieta, Administrator of the 
Panama Canal (this is the highest position in the ACP and is considered second only to 
the president in the Panamanian power structure), has made the plans known.  The 
PSCP team writes in an “Open Letter to Engineer Alberto Alemán Zubieta” that 
Alemán Zubieta told Panamanian legislators during the second and third debates prior 
to approving Law 44 that dams would be built in the new area of the watershed on Río 
Indio, Río Coclé del Norte, and Río Caño Sucio.  Endara directly quotes Alemán 
Zubieta as saying, “the people that are there will have to be relocated” [translation 
mine].42  Hughes’s book also cites the 2000 ACP document “Concept of the 
Amplification of the Panama Canal” as mentioning the creation of embalses on these 
three rivers.43
 
The ACP established a Community Relations Team, or Social Team (Equipo 
Social) made up of sociologists and social workers in 2001, with the goal of easing the 
tensions that had developed since the passage of Law 44.  According to sociologist 
Milton Martínez, a member of the team, the ACP’s organic law (1997) incorporated 
“new, complex responsibilities,” beyond merely passing ships through the Canal, that 
would require some exploration and experimentation.44  Martínez acknowledges that 
before the creation of the team, there were conflicts in the communities due to the 
absence of information, and so the team’s goal is to make the ACP’s presence in the 
Western Watershed better understood.  He says that to establish open dialogue with the 
communities, there have been several work tables with representatives from the 
communities, as well as two Campesino meetings (Encuentros Campesinos), in 
September of 2001 and 2003, at which Alemán Zubieta has informed, consulted with, 
and acquired the cooperation of the communities.45   
 
The result of these Campesino meetings has been the publication of materials 
dealing with the Western Watershed that, while interesting, do not begin to address the 
social or technical criticisms of the embalse project.  According to Alemán Zubieta, the 
purpose of these studies is to satisfy the request campesinos/as made at these meetings 
for more information “about the natural resources of the place where they live and 
work,” as well as a description of “the quality of life of the people who inhabit the area” 
[translation mine].46  These studies were performed in collaboration with the Louis 
Berger Group, Inc., the University of Panama, and the Smithsonian Tropical Research 
Institute.  They provide information about the endangered species living in the Western 
Watershed, the different habitats that exist, the number of species of birds, insects, 
reptiles, amphibians, and mammals, the land use patterns, and such factors as health and 
education levels of the inhabitants.  The ACP has also commissioned studies that 
                                                 
41 Neil King, Jr., “Panama Canal at Crossroads,” The Wall Street Journal, 7 January 2004. 
42 Quotation cited in Equipo de la Oficina Nacional de Pastoral Social-Cáritas Panamá, “Carta Abierta al 
Ingeniero Alberto Alemán Zubieta,” La Carta 84 (July, 2002), 2. 
43 Hughes, 1. 
44 Milton Martínez, interview by author, Corozal, Panama, 27 May 2004. 
45 Milton Martínez, interview by author, Corozal, Panama, 27 May 2004. 
46 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “Resumen del Estudio 2003: Recopilación y Presentación de Datos 
Ambientales y Culturales de la Región Occidental de la Cuenca del Canal de Panamá,” and “Resumen del 
Estudio 2003: Recopilación y Presentación de Datos Socioeconómicos de la Región Occidental de la 
Cuenca del Canal.”  The first of these two quotations by Alemán Zubieta can also be found in “Fauna 
Terrestre: Resumen del Inventario de Especies de Animales Terrestres en la Región Occidental de la 
Cuenca del Canal de Panamá,” 2002. 
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addressed the issue of the artificial lakes in the Western Watershed, prepared by 
Montgomery Watson Harza and TAM Consultants, Inc.: “Río Indio Water Supply 
Project: Feasibility Study,” “The Río Coclé del Norte and Caño Sucio Water Supply 
Project,” “The Upper Chagres Water Supply Project,” and “Long-term Forecast for 
Municipal and Industrial Water Demand and Raw Water Consumption/Comparative 
Analysis of Cost and Pricing.”  However, these documents, while listed in the ACP 
Library’s computer system, are confidential until the ACP Board of Directors (Junta 
Directiva) approves them, and they are thus unavailable to the public.  Until then, those 
interested in the results of the feasibility studies can bide their time reading about what 
percentage of the Western Watershed is used for agriculture. 
 
Pastoral Social-Cáritas’s Critique of the ACP 
 
The major problem that PSCP literature cites again and again is not that the ACP 
desires to modernize the Canal, but rather the authoritarian and secretive manner with 
which the ACP has dealt with the Western Watershed project and presented it to the 
public and to the people who live there.  In the words of three bishops at the 
Panamanian Episcopal Conference, “It seems to us that the lack of clarity in the 
intentions of the ACP as regards the project of the expansion of the Canal’s Watershed 
is the cause of the anxiety and disquiet of those who dwell in these areas” [translation 
mine].47  The PSCP laments in its open letter to Alemán Zubieta that the ACP orginally 
presented information and then retracted that information, acting as if it had never 
provided the information in the first place.  For this reason, it appears to the PSCP team 
that when the ACP says that no decision has been made, in reality the ACP is hiding the 
truth in order to tranquilize the people whose land is in danger.  Similarly, the members 
of the team find unacceptable the ACP’s silence in the face of criticism of the project: 
 
We do not understand your silence, and that of the Panama Canal 
Authority that you administer, in the face of questions formulated by 
people recognized in the fields of engineering, sociology, economics, 
law, and ecology...making serious and well-founded arguments...Silence 
can never be a response when the life and future of thousands of families 
are at stake [translation mine].48   
 
It is to be seen whether the announcement this month will break this silence. 
 
 Another major general cause of concern is that, for nearly five years, the people 
living in the watersheds of Río Indio, Río Caño Sucio, and Río Coclé del Norte do not 
have a reason to feel secure.  The only assurance that they may be able to keep their 
land is that the ACP says that nothing has been decided yet, and, if they lose their land, 
the only assurance that they will be compensated adequately is the ACP’s suggestion 
that the embalses and/or the relocation will improve their quality of life; a 1999 
Community Bulletin that the ACP released (which never made it past the first issue) 
wrote that quality of life would be raised by such factors as, “new work opportunities, 
more roads, new sources of water, new sources of electricity, technical assistance 
programs, and economic development through tourism and commerce” [translation 
                                                 
47 José Dimas Cedeño, Uriah Ashley, and Carlos María Ariz, letter to Silvia Vergara de Batista, 27 
February 2003; published in La Carta 93 (May, 2003), 3. 
48 Equipo de la Oficina Nacional de Pastoral Social-Cáritas Panamá, “Carta Abierta al Ingeniero Alberto 
Alemán Zubieta,” La Carta 84 (July, 2002), 2. 
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mine].49  However, after publishing this bulletin in 1999, the ACP has not repeated this 
idea in any successive publication, so even this meager source of assurance has 
dissolved.   
 
The PSCP team explains that, while there is a law that gives the ACP authority 
over the lands of the Western Watershed, “there is neither law nor document that 
guarantees the campesinos/as the compensation that they deserve for losing their lands, 
and this has created desolation among this population” [translation mine].50  The ACP, 
perhaps in an attempt to provide this type of assurance, has begun a $4.2-million 
National Land-Titling Program (Programa Nacional de Titulación de Tierras, or 
PRONAT), granting titles to farmers who had previously worked the land without 
ownership.  According to Martínez of the ACP, this is an attempt to prove to doubters 
that Law 44 does not automatically mean appropriation of their lands.51  However, 
according to University of Panama Professor of Sociology Marco A. Gandásegui, hijo, 
unless the people are incorporated into the market practice, land titles on their own are 
meaningless.  He explains that the benefit of having title to land is that the property 
represents capital that can potentially be invested.  If the person receiving the title is not 
incorporated into the market, he or she will simply continue to work the land, the same 
as prior to receiving the title, and will likely sell the title when a speculator comes 
along.52  How can these campesinos/as be incorporated into the market process?  
Gandásegui suggests that the first steps to stimulating campesinos/as to produce more 
than they consume are social investments, such as roads and schools.  However, 
Gandásegui warns that “transforming them from non-capitalist peasants to capitalist 
farmers is a complicated process.  It takes time and more effort than simply handing 
over a piece of paper.”53
 
Concerns of Foul Play 
 
 The other way that the ACP has attempted to demonstrate that it is concerned 
with the well-being of the campesinos/as in the Western Watershed is through a series 
of Work Tables (mesas del trabajo) between ACP officials and, supposedly, 
campesino/a delegates elected by their communities.  However, according to the oral 
and written testimonies that the Interdiocese Commission collected, these delegates 
were never elected and were instead hand-picked by the ACP.  In addition, the ACP 
rewarded these delegates handsomely, so not surprisingly, the delegates often returned 
from the work tables with opinions supportive of the ACP.  To a person who earns an 
average of only $150 per year,54 payments of $10 for a signature verifying attendance, 
$10 for each neighbor or relative brought, and compensation for transportation and 
work days lost are incredibly large sums.  In addition, the ACP rewarded these 
campesinos/as by paying them double or triple the norm for tasks such as mailing 
                                                 
49 Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “Comunidades: Noticias de la Cuenca del Canal de Panamá,” 
(Panama: November, 1999); cited in Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a las Comunidades Afectadas 
por la Ley 44, 57. 
50 Equipo de la Oficina de Pastoral Social-Cáritas Panamá, “¡Lo Primero es la Patria!: Antes Que 
Cualquier Otra Cosa, está Panamá Entero,” La Carta 67 (November, 2000), 2. 
51 Milton Martinez, interview by author, Corozal, Panamá, 27 May 2004. 
52 Marco A. Gandásegui, hijo, interview by author, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, Panama, 25 
May 2004. 
53 Gandásegui, 25 May 2004. 
54 Gandásegui, 25 May 2004. 
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letters, clearing trails, and carrying packages up and down rivers.55  In other words, the 
ACP has taken advantage of these campesinos/as’s extreme poverty to buy support and 
complicity and to divide the communities.   
 
 Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the conflict has been the attempts to 
suppress the efforts of the members of PSCP and the CCCE.  Two recent incidents have 
no proven connection to these groups nor to the ACP, but they have nevertheless 
impeded the work and personal liberty of individuals and of the groups in general.  The 
first was the refusal by the Panamanian government to renew the permanent visa of 
Francisco Aperador, a Spanish missionary who has worked with PSCP in opposition to 
Law 44 and to the construction of the embalses in the Western Watershed.  While 
governmental authorities have called Aperador “a danger to public safety,” they have 
not answered the Catholic Church’s requests for explanation or evidence.56  Along with 
PSCP, groups such as the Commission for Justice and Peace and the Christian 
Brotherhood of Sick Persons maintain that Aperador represented no danger and argue 
instead that the expulsion is an attempt “to impede the social labor of the church” 
[translation mine].57  The second incident is the abduction and beating of Francisco 
Hernández, the CCCE leader of the central Río Indio area, which occurred the morning 
of May 30, 2004.  At a CCCE press conference June 2, 2004, Hernández explained that 
after losing consciousness from blows to the head, he did not awake until the following 
evening, 200 kilometers from where he was abducted.  While he could not identify the 
two men who gave him the blows because he lost consciousness almost immediately, he 
does not doubt that the incident is related to his position opposing the embalses.58  The 
majority of the approximately 60 people in attendence were campesinos/as who had 
traveled to the city to demonstrate their support for Hernández.  These two incidents are 
unarguably troubling, and they have reinforced to the groups that their opposition 
efforts have not been appreciated by some, perhaps powerful, individuals. 
 
The Bigger Picture 
 
 Later this month, the ACP will announce its official plan for the Canal 
Amplification Project, and among the information to be disclosed will be the decision as 
to whether to dam the three rivers in the so-called Western Watershed and flood the 
villages.  Regardless of how this conflict resolves, its development over the last five 
years reveals a pattern of behavior on the part of the ACP that includes pursuing only 
one of many alternatives, obscuring its motives, and acting without consultation from 
those who will be affected most directly.  For these campesinos/as, concepts such as 
lakes drowning homes and obligatory relocation have been concrete enough to 
understand in personal terms.  The ACP’s assurance that nothing had been decided was 
not enough to keep them from worrying and organizing in an effort to prevent a project 
from occurring that was not in their best interests.  If the ACP announces that its 
amplification plans will not involve embalses or will only require one embalse, both of 
which are quite possible, the efforts of the CCCE and PSCP will have been successful.  
Even if the ACP affirms that it will dam the rivers, the groups will have achieved a 
certain level of success in raising the issue to the level of common awareness outside of 
                                                 
55 Comisión Interdiocesana de Acompañamiento a las Comunidades Afectadas por la Ley 44, 63-65. 
56 Eduardo Martínez F., “Rechazan Expulsión de Misionero Aperador,” El Panamá América, 25 May 
2004. 
57 Eduardo Martínez F., “Rechazan Expulsión de Misionero Aperador.” 
58 Francisco Hernandez, CCCE press conference, Plaza Cinco de Mayo, Panama, 2 June 2004. 
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the Western Watershed.  The integral first step to these modest successes was to suspect 
the potential personal damage that the project could cause. 
 
 Unfortunately, the behavior pattern described above is not limited to the conflict 
surrounding the Western Watershed, nor is it unique to the ACP.  The ominous failure 
to reveal key information has characterized the entire amplification project, especially 
relating to questions of financing the project.  The most basic example relates to the 
ACP’s estimates of the cost of the project.  The Tripartite Commission estimated in 
1993 that the construction of a third set of locks Post-Panamax would cost $6.9 billion 
in 1990 prices, which would be more than $10 billion in 2002 considering inflation.  
The ACP declared that the cost of a third set of locks Post-Panamax almost identical to 
the plans of the Tripartite Commission would cost only $4 billion in 2002.  As Drohan 
observes, it is unlikely that the ACP could have devised a way to spend so much less on 
a plan whose costs were carefully estimated by experts from Panama, the United States, 
and Japan.59
 
 What would motivate the ACP to underestimate sharply the cost of the project?  
According to University of Aalborg (Denmark) Professor Bent Flyvberg in his 2003 
book Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition, purposefully underestimating 
costs is a strategy that promoters of multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects regularly 
use to sell their megaprojects.  Flyvberg and colleagues performed a study published in 
2002 of 258 transport infrastructure projects worth approximately $90 billion (1995 
prices), the first such study with a large enough N to establish statistically significant 
conclusions.  Findings include that in nine out of ten such projects costs are 
underestimated, that there is no decrease in cost underestimation and overrun over the 
last seventy years, that, in data for rail projects, the underestimation and overrun 
phenomena seem more severe in developing nations than in North America and Europe, 
and that error alone cannot explain the phenomena.60  Using data from this study as well 
as case studies in greater detail, Flyvberg concludes that: 
 
The cost estimates used in public debates, media coverage, and decision 
making for transport infrastructure development are highly, 
systematically, and significantly deceptive.  So are the cost-benefit 
analyses into which cost estimates are routinely fed to calculate the 
viability and ranking of projects.61
 
With these findings in mind, it is advisable that Panamanians view all ACP cost 
estimates of the new locks, especially those that are lower than $10 billion, with a 
critical eye.  As such, it is possible that a decision not to build embalses in the Western 
Watershed could represent, not a success of the CCCE/PSCP, but a strategic move by 
the ACP to be able to estimate a lower price for the project and increase their chance of 
approval.  In any case, with the high (ninety percent in the above study) likelihood of 
overcosts, Panamanian decision makers must question not only if the estimates are 
financeable but where the money will come from if there are cost overruns. 
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Financial Concerns Unanswered 
 
 The question of how the Canal Amplification project will be funded is another 
area where scrunity is needed to judge the validity of the ACP’s public statements.  
Alberto Alemán Zubieta, the Administrator of the Panama Canal, told the public in 
1997 that the Panama Canal could self-finance the construction of the third set of 
locks.62  Even using the ACP’s cost estimates, which, as discussed above, are likely 
underestimates, the prospects for self-funding of the project are doubtful.  William 
Hughes, professor of economics at the University of Panama, shows that at the very 
least, self-financing will take 29 years to pay for the project.  He uses the ACP’s 2000 
estimate for the cost of the whole project of $6.055 billion, and the fact that the Canal 
gives to Panama an average of $165 million per year, which subtracts the $35 million 
per year for water that Panama pays the ACP from the $200 million that the ACP gives 
to the National Treasury.  Even though in the last twenty years, the amount of maritime 
cargo has been increasing at an annual rate of 2.1 percent, Hughes considers rates of 
both 2.1 and 3 percent, and he considers interest rates of 6.5 and 9 percent for financing.  
These four situations predict 29 years for a cargo increase rate of 3 percent and interest 
rate of 6.5 percent but 48, 51, and more than 60 years for the other, more likely, 
outcomes.63  These data are alarming because the numbers (using the ACP’s possible 
cost underestimate) mean that if the ACP self-finances the project, there will be between 
thirty and sixty years when Panama receives no money from the Panama Canal’s 
operations.  This will force the government to spend $165-200 billion less per year 
(which would mean less money going to schools, roads, health care, and services) or to 
take out loans and increase the national debt. 
 
The ACP continues to claim that the project will not cost Panama anything.  
Assistant Administrator of the Canal Ricauter Vazquez told the Associated Press this 
April that the ACP “would not expect the central government to participate in the 
financing” of the Canal expansion and suggested that funding may be available from 
interested international financial institutions.64  Francisco Miguez, coordinator of the 
Master Plan for the Canal, also recently said, “Once we have a project that would 
include an expansion, if it is profitable, there will be no lack of funding.”65  However, 
Drohan points out in a November, 2003, article in El Panamá América that none of the 
companies that pass boats through the Panama Canal, those that would supposedly 
benefit most from an expanded canal, is willing to contribute to the project.  To avoid a 
half-century without income from the Canal, which could occur from Panama Canal 
self-financing, the ACP will need to prove that Miguez’s assertion is correct.  In order 
to do this, the ACP will need to convince private companies or foreign governments that 
the investment will be a profitable one, a challenge in which, according to Drohan, the 
ACP has not yet succeeded. 
 
Drohan urges that if no users, corporations, or governments are willing to invest 
in a project, it means that all these groups think that the project is not likely to succeed.  
Drohan explains, “the naval industry does not need a Post-Panamax lock urgently 
                                                 
62 Rolando Rodríguez B., “Canal Puede Financiar Nuevas Esclusas: Alemán,” La Prensa, 19 March 1997, 
3A. 
63 Hughes, 30-32. 
64 Aguilar, 30 April 2004. 
65 Aguilar, 30 April 2004. 
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enough to take responsibility for such an investment” [translation mine].66  If the 
opinions of so many other institutions worldwide is that the project is a bad investment, 
Panama ought to wonder if the same is not true for the country, especially with 2.8 
million people depending on it.  This observation is in line with one of Flyvberg’s 
criteria for project security, which is the investment of private risk capital.  Flyvberg 
suggests that a multibillion-dollar megaproject should only be untertaken if private 
financiers are willing to invest their own money to begin the project.  By doing this, and 
“by letting them bear the consequences of a wrong decision, there will be a better 
guarantee that a project will indeed only be implemented if there is a demand for it.”67  
This criterion is especially essential when the sovereign state that would otherwise have 
to accept the risk is one as vulnerable to debt as Panama.  Panama’s external debt, 
which reached $5.632 billion in 1999, continues to grow despite the hundreds of 
millions of dollars spent every year servicing the debt.68  Economists Eduard Niesten 
and John Reid warn that “if Panama were to undertake the Expansion of the Panama 
Canal Watershed, it would double its level of indebtedness and slow its payment of 
capital or interests” [translation mine].69  Thus, before Panamanians support the 
expansion plan, they must demand external risk capital or carefully consider whether 
the potential gains from the project are worth compromising the future growth of the 
country by severely increasing the debt which has crippled Panama’s economic 
autonomy for more than twenty years. 
 
What Can Panama Hope to Gain? 
 
It is not solely the ACP’s responsibility to ensure that the Canal Amplification 
Project does not turn the Panamanian economy upside-down; the Panamanian 
government, too, should take responsibility in preparing Panama for the changes that 
the project will bring in the next several decades.  As Gandásegui notes, the Canal 
expansion will require a host of specialists, technicians, engineers, and workers, most of 
whom Panama is not ready to provide.  As a result, Panama will not stop depending on 
technologies developed elsewhere.  He argues that if Panama continues lagging in the 
production of competent scientists, Panama will be accused, “with reason, of being 
incapable of making the technical decisions necessary to face future challenges” 
[translation mine].70  In such a situation, Panama will have missed a valuable 
opportunity for progress, growth, and learning.  This lost opportunity is not only a 
theoretical concept anymore; a French-Belgian consortium has been hired to create the 
blueprints for new locks at the Pacific entrance to the Canal, and the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers is doing the same for the Atlantic side.71   Gandásegui suggests that the 
government, the country’s scientific institutions, and the ACP work together now to 
develop an education system that will be capable of producing the specialists that the 
project will need.  This would give Panama an active role in its own future (unlike its 
observer role during the Canal construction), and it would provide a way for a much 
larger sector of the Panamanian people to benefit from the Canal expansion.72
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Beyond benefitting ideally from involvement in the project, Panamanians must 
be certain that the project will result in real economic gains for the country.  To do this, 
they must critically evaluate the claims of the ACP that the Canal will become obsolete 
if they do not expand the canal and build Post-Panamax locks.  Currently, the largest 
boats that can fit through the Panama Canal (Panamax) hold up to 4,000 TEU.  The new 
Post-Panamax locks that the ACP is considering constructing would fit Post-Panamax 
boats of up to 12,000 TEU capacity.  A 2003 La Prensa article states that 25-30 percent 
of new boat orders for 2003 are Post-Panamax (larger than 4,000 TEU), and that of 
those boats, 78 percent are larger than 8,000 TEU.73  The ACP literature and the 
Niesten and Reid book verify that larger boats being built.  However, this does not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that many people seem to accept.  A recent New 
York Times article states (without citing data) that “the 90-year-old canal is at risk of 
becoming obsolete as vessels being built in Asia—as long as the Empire State building 
is tall—will be too big to squeeze through its locks.”74  In order to claim that increasing 
numbers of Post-Panamax boats means Panama Canal obsolescence, one has to prove 
that these Post-Panamax boats would go through the Panama Canal if they could.  
However, many of these boats are built to traverse routes that do not involve the 
Panama Canal, for example, Asia to the West Coast of the United States, or Europe to 
the East Coast of the United States.  Even among those from Asia destined for the East 
Coast of the United States, the route through the Suez Canal is shorter for all ports south 
of Hong Kong, the number one container port in Asia.75  For those north of Hong Kong, 
the extra travel time (between several hours and two days) required through the Suez 
Canal may still be worthwhile if Panama significantly raises tolls to finance the Canal 
Amplification Project.76  The fact that many of the new large boats have no interest in 
using the Panama Canal diminishes the significance of the fact that they cannot fit 
through the Panama Canal. 
 
Similarly, another criticism of the argument that boats are outgrowing the 
Panama Canal is that traffic depends on cargo, not on boat size.  If new locks are built 
to fit much larger ships but the amount of cargo passing through the Canal continues to 
increase at an annual rate of only 2.1 percent, traffic will decrease significantly, as all 
the necessary cargo will fit in a smaller number of boats.77  This will benefit some 
shipping companies, because they will be able to send the same amount of cargo with 
fewer ships, but it will not benefit Panama because the new locks will not increase the 
amount of cargo passing through the Canal.  Many companies may opt to continue to 
send Panamax and smaller boats because the amount of cargo they send may not justify 
a larger boat.  
 
Furthermore, the amount of cargo that Panamax and smaller sized boats carried 
between 1994 and 2003 increased much more significantly than the amount of cargo all 
Post-Panamax boats carried, even though each individual Panamax and smaller boat has 
a lower capacity.  According to a 2003 Institute of Shipping Logistics (ISL) study of the 
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period 1994-2003, in every year of the study boats up to 3,999 TEU carried more cargo 
annually than boats greater than 4,000 TEU.  Not only do Panamax and smaller boats 
carry more cargo than Post-Panamax boats, their 10-year increase in annual cargo was 
150,000 TEU higher than the increase in annual cargo of Post-Panamax boats (see 
figure 2).78  These data suggest that the increasing construction of Post-Panamax boats 
is only marginally relevant to the Panama Canal’s operations.  The world-wide use of 
Panamax and smaller boats is increasing even faster, and this explains how the Panama 
Canal consistently served approximately four percent of world maritime commerce 
throughout the 1990s, even as world maritime commerce experienced solid growth.79
 
Figure 2: Container fleet development by TEU-size classes as of January 1, 1994-2003 
 
 
 
Source: Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, “ISL Shipping Statistics and Market Review 
2003,” <http://www.isl.org/products_services/publications/samples/cargo.shtml.en>. 
 
Conclusion: ACP Has Explaining to Do 
 
The ACP must go beyond simply claiming that increases in worldwide cargo 
and ship sizes will make the Panama Canal obsolete; rather, the Canal Authority must 
show studies that support their claims.  These studies, if they exist, are not available to 
the public.  This is exactly what has happened in the microcosm of the Western 
Watershed, and this is why those who have fought so vigorously against the 
construction of the artificial lakes must not let their guard down if the ACP announces 
that it will not build the lakes.  The risks to the Panamanian people ten or twenty years 
in the future will remain even if the immediate risks to the campesinos/as in the 
Western Watershed pass.  The larger risks are hard to see, especially when evasive 
rhetoric may seem on the surface to negate them.  As seen above, even the New York 
Times did not question the concept of Panama Canal obsolescence or demand relevant 
facts.   
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Unfortunately, the same secrecy and lack of transparency that characterized the 
ACP’s behavior in the issue of artificial lakes is what obscures the public’s 
understanding of the financeability and profitability of the project as a whole.  As 
shown in this paper, the ACP has employed all of the following behaviors in pursuing 
its agenda in the Western Watershed: 
 
• Expanding its authority through the passage of Legislative Assembly laws; 
• Underestimating the number of people to be affected;  
• Ignoring less destructive alternatives;  
• Denying having spoken documented words; 
• Failing to address criticism; 
• Buying complaisance from extremely poor people. 
 
In addition, the suspicious expulsion of missionary Aperador and beating of CCCE 
leader Hernández complete the picture of the difficulties those who oppose the ACP’s 
Western Watershed embalse project have faced.  These must not be forgotten when the 
time comes for the public to consider the Canal Amplification Project.  All of the 
concerns that have been cited in this paper, from the estimation of costs to the names of 
the supposedly interested international financing instititutions to the estimation of traffic 
increases based on prior data, need to be addressed individually and specifically.  For 
this to happen, the ACP will have to change its authoritarian, secretive policies. The 
ACP must disprove the fears of those who, faced with a scarcity of apparent benefits to 
the Panamanian people, conjecture personal gain and corruption as the true forces 
propelling this project. 
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Research Questions 
 
• How has the current conflict surrounding the Western Watershed of the Panama 
Canal developed? 
• How does this conflict compare with the conflict surrounding the Canal 
Amplification Project in general? 
• What can be learned from these conflicts? 
 
Methodology 
 
Structured and unstructured interviews, along with library and Internet research, 
have been the primary methods of data collection.  Both structured and unstructured 
interviews involve devising a set of questions to ask ahead of time, asking the questions 
planned, and recording the answers.  The difference between them is that in structured 
interviews, questions are asked in a pre-conceived order, while in unstructured 
interviews, the interviewer does not reveal that the questions have an order and asks 
them in a manner that is most appropriate with the flow of the conversation.  Structured 
interviews were used in interviewing professors, ACP employees, and leaders of 
popular organizations, such as Pastoral Social-Cáritas, the Campesino Coordinating 
Group against the Embalses (CCCE), the Popular Coordinating Group for Human 
Rights in Panama (Coordinadora Popular de Derechos Humanos en Panamá, or 
COPODEHUPA), Alternative Legal Assistance of Panama (Asistencia Legal 
Alternativa de Panamá, or ALAP), and the Public Defender (Defensoría del Pueblo).  
Unstructured interviews were used with engineers and with campesinos/as who 
attended the CCCE press conference.  Interviews were mainly conducted with pen and 
paper.  Occasionally, a tape recorder was used if prior consent was given, but this was 
found to be less successful due to the poor quality of the tape recorder used and the 
discomfort it caused to those being interviewed.  Each time, people being interviewed 
were asked for suggestions of other people and resources to consult, and this method 
helped both to find more obscure information and to succeed in contacting important by 
using the recommender as a reference. 
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